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BOOK REVIEWS
VICTORY THROUGH AIR POWER. By Major P. de Seversky:
Simon and Schuster, New York, 1942. Pp. 354.
This book was published after our April quarterly had gone to press. Hence
this belated review. It is just as well, because the earlier ones have used a
more conventional approach than will be employed here.
It is the most brilliant book yet to appear on the present war. No one has
written anything more truly prophetic, and yet it is a book primarily analytical,
not prophetic. A logical explanation is provided for the successes, great and not
so great, and for the failures of the Axis air power. In Poland, Holland, and
France the Luftwaffe took out all opposition with high-speed, heavy-load
bombers, protected by high-speed fighters, the whole operation being designed for
a particular region and with the tactical purpose of clearing the way for and
afterwards supporting the ground forces. In the Battle of Britain these same
planes were too short on flying range (200 miles) and too light on fire power and
individual bomb power. Added to this, the tide was turned by the advantage of
fire power in each British aircraft of from four-to-one to eight-to-one, which
more than canceled the German aircraft numerical superiority of three-to-one.
In Russia the tactical objective is taking territory rather than sheer destruction,
and the necessity of setting up new air bases each 200 miles has greatly hampered
the German occupation of Russia's vastness. Until lately in the Pacific, Japan
has had better armed planes with a higher power and rate-of-climb than those
she encountered. The Seversky formula just as easily accounts for today's Axis
successes in Lybia, where the Luftwaffe is employing sky-trucks, air-borne
machine ships, and air ambulances.
As to the formula just mentioned, the book reviews itself if you will give
attention to three random-selected paragraphs:
"The most significant single fact about the war now in progress is the
emergence of aviation as the paramount and decisive factor in warmaking.
There is still some difference of opinion as to the precise role of aviation in the
immediate future, its relation to the older military services, its role in this or
that specific battle or campaign. But there are no two opinions on the fundamental fact that aviation has altered the traditional textbook conceptions of
strategy and tactics. All experts agree that air power will play an ever more
decisive part in determining the power balance among the nations of the earth.
But it does not need an expert to recognize this toweringtruth. It is inescapable
in the day-to-day news from every theater of conflict."
"The challenge of air power cannot be met by merely 'admitting' our
failures and undertaking to 'catch up' with more advanced countries. The tempo
of air-power expansion is much too swift. A nation content to imitate and
Icatch up' must in the nature of the case remain backward, trailing foreign
leaders. The method of trial-and-error is ruled out because the penalty for
error may be loss of national independence. We cannot afford to wait and see,
to suspend judgment; we may not have a second chance. The challenge can be
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met only by exploring the physical and psychological causes of our tardiness and
weakness in the air, applying radical surgery rather than surface cures, and
preparing for nothing less than undisputed first place in the epochal race for
aerial supremacy."
"America's aerial potential, as compared to that of the Axis, is so clearly
greater that in the race for supremacy in the skies victory is assured. We must,
however, bear in mind that the differential is being rapidly reduced as the
Germans and the Japanese lay hands on new sources of supply. Hence the
immense importance of acting now, when the advantages are still overwhelmingly
on our side. Tomorrow it may be a race between approximate equals; today our
margin of superiority in materials, productive forces, and brains is still large
enough to guarantee success."
Finally, the language of the book is simple and incisive, which with
abundant illustrations, give it universal reader interest and understanding.
Perhaps its chief function will be to so well and intelligently inform all of the
American public on war aviation that there will be no mistake as to the future
course of our public officials, civil and military. Indeed, every adult in the
United Nations should read this book.
The book has one fault, and even this may be arguable. The author envisions
so clearly the future beyond the immediate that at times he tramps with sevenleague boots over a necessary period of development and transition. Thus seadogs and other die-hards are provided with an opportunity to pooh-pooh the logic
of he who would eventually abolish navies and armies as such. It would have
been better to put it that the older arms keep their identity but become "aviationized," as they have become motorized. And yet Major de Seversky may be
right. It is difficult to take issue with one of his experience and proven vision
and ability. His arguments must be regarded as temperate, at the least. Surely
so when latest details of the great Naval victory at Midway turn it into a
triumph for land-based, long-range bombers which by-passed the protecting
battle-wagons of the Japanese Naval task force and turned back the attack by
sinking all or nearly all of the carriers with consequent loss of the enemy
aircraft.
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